WASHINGTON, September 20 — President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are due to meet in Washington next week, a summit previewed two days ago by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis and the online magazine ChinaFile in a joint article titled “What to Watch at the Xi-Trump Summit.” The CCA contributors — Neil Thomas, Lizzi C. Lee, Craig Allen, Paul Triolo, Helen Toner, Lyle Morris and Jing Qian — set out what each side wants, and what each is prepared to give up.
The short answer, on the evidence assembled, is rather less than the billing suggests.
Beijing’s calculus
Thomas, a Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics, wrote that Beijing sees the present moment as a golden opportunity to accelerate industrial self-reliance and strengthen its geoeconomic leverage while limiting further U.S. pressure. Many Chinese strategists regard the U.S. president as a relatively benign figure in Washington when it comes to dealing with Beijing. Word around the American capital, Thomas noted, is that more hawkish officials have drafted several proposals to hobble China’s high-tech industries, ready to go should Trump sour on Xi.
That asymmetry shapes the Chinese approach. Beijing is eager to make the summit a success in Trump’s eyes without making significant concessions on AI-model distillation, industrial overcapacity or rare-earth export controls.
Thomas expected progress on Trump’s Board of Trade and Board of Investment initiatives, promises of additional Chinese purchases of U.S. goods, more dialogues, and an extension of the economic truce. He added a caveat that rather undercuts the exercise: any agreed duration would be moot if Trump pivots on China. If all goes well, the two leaders may close the summit by confirming that Trump will attend APEC in Shenzhen and Xi the G20 in Miami later in 2026.
The strong hand, and its limits
Lee, a Fellow on Chinese Economy, wrote that China comes to Washington with a strong hand. Xi has good reason to lower tensions with the U.S., she argued, but will not make concessions on Beijing’s manufacturing ambitions because those strengths explain the country’s current resilience. Then the turn.
That resilience may itself be a deeper source of vulnerability, since a model supported by domestic tech and manufacturing strength and external tech demand is unusually vulnerable to geopolitical risks, including export controls and swings in the global AI investment boom. Lee said she is not optimistic about a grand deal this month.
Signs that both sides are willing to build machinery for a deeper conversation on healthier, more balanced economic models would matter, she wrote, and leadership-level intent still has to translate into bureaucratic incentives on both sides.
What business is watching
Craig Allen, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CCA, wrote that technology-industry CEOs will be interested to see whether the export control truce agreed at APEC last year is extended. Under that arrangement, both sides agreed to postpone implementation of new and expansive export control measures for one year. To date both governments have myriad complaints about the other.
Washington is concerned about lack of access to rare earth elements. Beijing is concerned about lack of access to aircraft parts and recently announced FCC regulations.
For all the noise about a grand bargain, the salient point may be narrower. The machinery of the relationship — boards, dialogues, truces — is what is actually on the table next week. Whether any of it outlasts the summit is another matter.
