WASHINGTON, September 21 — The United States is preparing to tell dozens of partner countries that they may have to choose between American and Chinese approaches to cooperation in artificial intelligence, according to a draft letter from the U.S. State Department seen by Reuters. The letter concerns the 35 countries that signed the American AI Opportunity Statement adopted in June. It warns that these countries may not be able to participate simultaneously in the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative and a competing Chinese initiative on artificial intelligence.
The draft has not yet been sent to its recipients, and its contents may still change.
What Washington Is Actually Asking
The initiative reflects Washington’s view that artificial intelligence is not simply an economic sector but a strategic technology ecosystem encompassing advanced semiconductors, computing capacity, data centers, critical minerals, energy infrastructure, research networks, technology standards and investment. From Washington’s perspective, a country’s participation in China-linked initiatives such as WAICO may raise questions that go far beyond AI regulation itself. The American argument is that technology partnerships can create long-term dependencies and may potentially facilitate the transfer, spread or circumvention of restrictions on technologies that Washington considers strategically sensitive.
The main message behind the initiative appears to be that Washington sees participation in Pax Silica not simply as membership in another international forum, but as a strategic commitment.
Not Two Identical Blocs
One important point should be kept in mind. WAICO and Pax Silica should not be treated as fully symmetrical organizations. Pax Silica is primarily focused on the security and resilience of critical technology supply chains — from minerals and energy to semiconductors, computing infrastructure and artificial intelligence.
Based on available information, WAICO places much greater emphasis on building national capacity, international AI governance, access to technology, workforce development and greater participation by developing countries in the emerging global AI ecosystem. It may therefore be more accurate to describe them not as two identical “AI blocs,” but as two competing approaches to the emerging technological order.
The American approach can be broadly described as: “Secure the technology ecosystem.” The Chinese approach is more focused on another idea: “Expand access to the technology ecosystem.”
Why the Choice Is Hard for the Global South
For countries in the Global South, the second approach is particularly attractive. This does not mean that China is acting purely out of altruism. By providing infrastructure, equipment, AI models, training and technology platforms, Beijing gains clear strategic advantages.
The wider use of Chinese technologies also helps spread Chinese standards, products and institutional practices. As AI becomes increasingly connected to semiconductor manufacturing, critical minerals, energy, data centers, computing capacity and national security, Central Asian countries will face growing pressure over their choice of technology partners.
It is realistic to expect Washington to become increasingly demanding about where its partners stand on certain sensitive technologies. It is much less realistic, however, to expect Central Asian countries to abandon their multi-vector foreign policies and choose one technology ecosystem at the expense of the other. This distinction is fundamental.
What to watch next is whether the draft letter reaches its recipients in its current form, and how the 35 signatories of the June statement respond once it does.
