Strategic Shifts in Contested Waters
China’s first aircraft carrier forms an evolving pattern of voyages in disputed Asian seas, raising fresh questions about the limits of diplomatic codes. The strategic significance of these carrier deployments in contested waters sits at the heart of mounting regional friction. An estimated US$3.36 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, according to Wikipedia, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade.
For Beijing, the stakes are concrete rather than abstract. According to Wikipedia, 80 percent of China’s energy imports and 40 percent of China’s total trade passes through the South China Sea. Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes. Maritime security remains a persistent issue, as ongoing disputes present daily challenges for shipping.
Historical Context and Territorial Claims
According to researchers cited on Wikipedia, claims to any of the features were not seriously made until the 19th or the early 20th century. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Vietnam have conflicting island and maritime claims in the region. The disputes involve islands, reefs, banks, and other features, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. The waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which some regard as geographically part of the South China Sea, are disputed as well.
By the 1970s, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam had militarily occupied one or more of the Spratly Islands, according to Wikipedia. By 2015, the People’s Republic of China had established 8 outposts, Malaysia 5, the Philippines 8, Taiwan 1, and Vietnam 48. For decades, the Philippines and Vietnam were the most active in building artificial islands in the area, but from 2014 to 2016 China’s construction activity outpaced them. According to Wikipedia, China had reclaimed around five square miles with its artificial islands by 2023, at least one of which housed military equipment.
China’s actions in the South China Sea have been criticized as part of its salami-slicing or cabbage-wrapping strategies, according to Wikipedia. A 2016 arbitration tribunal concluded that China lacks historical titles to the maritime areas within the nine-dash line, though the ruling was rejected by both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. Since 2015, the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations in the region.
Diplomatic Friction and Rhetoric
Military activities have expanded alongside naval confrontations. According to The Diplomat, China has built a network of military facilities in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, some of which are now equipped to host bombers. In 2025, Vietnam commenced its own reclamation work on occupied features, building infrastructure to support a larger military presence. Naval confrontations between China and the Philippines continue, highlighting the fragility of stability in the contested waters.
Diplomatic rhetoric has grown sharper against this backdrop of physical expansion. China’s ambassador, Jing Quan, stated in his keynote at a forum promoting Philippines and China ties that maritime disputes should not define the entirety of bilateral relations, according to the Lowy Institute. Jing stated that China could easily win by force in its maritime disputes but chooses peace. According to the Lowy Institute, Jing told reporters on the sidelines of the Diliman Dialogues that China loves peace and enjoys regional peace compared to Ukraine, Gaza, and Venezuela.
Those remarks drew a swift and pointed reaction from Manila. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. described Jing’s comments as sounding very much like a threat and not a very diplomatic statement, according to the Lowy Institute. The comments came a day after Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro labelled China as a troublemaker in the region, and the Philippine Foreign Ministry subsequently summoned the Chinese ambassador to hear its serious concern and strong objection, according to the Lowy Institute.
The Upcoming Code of Conduct
To address overlapping maritime claims and disputes, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China have been negotiating a Code of Conduct to establish a rules-based framework, according to The Diplomat. After nearly two decades of negotiations, Manila, as the current ASEAN chair, has recently signaled that agreement on the Code of Conduct is at hand. Yet an agreement that lacks credible enforcement mechanisms, preserves ambiguity over compliance, or constrains Southeast Asian countries’ strategic autonomy could do little to address the region’s underlying security challenges, according to The Diplomat.
The substance of the agreement matters more than announcing its completion. According to The Diplomat, a Code of Conduct that primarily reiterates commitments to dialogue, restraint, and peaceful dispute resolution would have limited practical value. The agreement must include clear procedures for managing incidents, resolving disagreements, and addressing violations. Without a meaningful accountability mechanism, the Code of Conduct risks becoming merely a declaration of intent.
A second challenge involves ASEAN’s ability to ensure compliance among member states. According to The Diplomat, ASEAN’s consensus-based approach can complicate collective responses to violations when member states maintain different economic and security relationships with China. Furthermore, the agreement must protect Southeast Asian states’ strategic autonomy against provisions that might limit joint military exercises or defense partnerships with external powers. Naval confrontations and carrier voyages indicate that diplomatic commitments alone cannot guarantee responsible behavior.
Sources
- Territorial disputes in the South China Sea
- Words as weapons in the West Philippine Sea
- South China Sea Code of Conduct: A Deal Is Not Enough
Photo: 日本防衛省・統合幕僚監部 (CC BY 4.0)
